The Science of Consciousness

About this event

Our purpose in this group is to explore the science of consciousness, drawing from sources that range from neuroscience to cognitive psychology to philosophy of mind. Although we will occasionally draw from the insights of spiritual introspective traditions, our focus here will be on what can be supported by the best current science regarding how the mind supervenes on the brain. Zoom link will be posted 20 minutes before each meeting. Many authors argue that conscious experience involves a sense of self or self-consciousness. According to the strongest version of this claim, there can be no\* selfless states of consciousness*, namely states of consciousness that lack self-consciousness altogether. Disagreements about this claim are likely to remain merely verbal as long as the target notion of self-consciousness is not adequately specified. After distinguishing six notions of self-consciousness commonly discussed in the literature, I argue that none of the corresponding features is necessary for consciousness, because there are states of consciousness in which each of them is plausibly missing. ----- R. Milliere - The Varieties of Selflessness* Are there logically possible types of conscious experience that are nomologically impossible, given independently justified assumptions about the neural underpinnings of consciousness in human beings? In one sense, this is trivial: just consider the fact that the types of perceptual experiences we can have are limited by our sensory organs. But there may be non-trivial types of conscious experience that are impossible. For instance, if there is a basic type of self-consciousness, corresponding to a phenomenal property that is nomologically necessary for consciousness, then experiences lacking this phenomenal property will be (nomologically) impossible. ----- Wanja Wiese - Breaking the Self This week we will consider the two papers described above. They can both be found in the open access journal: Philosophy and the Mind Sciences. https://philosophymindscience.org/index.php/phimisci/issue/view/218